Oggetti del desiderio / III. La crescita economica a «V»

Chi prevede una ripresa a «V» pensa che tutto tornerà velocemente al livello antecedente la crisi. Con gli utili ante crisi la borsa statunitense non è cara, avendo un rapporto prezzo/utile intorno a 15. Con una crescita economica simile a quella passata, i debiti pubblici non vanno fuori controllo, perché le uscite volte a contenere la crisi si riducono in fretta, mentre aumentano le entrate fiscali. Alla base delle previsioni a «V» si ha l'idea che, come accaduto in passato, il rimbalzo arriva in fretta, anche grazie alle politiche economiche espansive. Quello che le previsioni a «V» non tengono nella dovuta considerazione sono le differenze rispetto al passato. Le differenze rispetto al passato sono cinque: 1) il credito è erogato con fatica; 2) il risparmio delle famiglie è risicato e dunque non può essere usato per aumentare i consumi; 3) il mercato del lavoro è meno elastico; 4) la domanda di abitazioni, prima di rilanciare l'economia, dovrà assorbire le molte case costruite e non vendute; 5) i bilanci degli stati e delle municipalità sono mal messi e non potranno essere usati per espandere la domanda.

Queste differenze, peraltro note, le abbiamo discusse molte volte, ma le segnaliamo nuovamente perché è significativo che esse siano appena state riproposte da Goldman Sachs (1): per affermare che non crede nella ripresa a «V». Portando il ragionamento alla sua coerenza operativa, la prossima tendenza dei mercati azionari e obbligazionari sarà al ribasso. È da vedere se chi afferma queste cose ha già i portafogli pronti per il ribasso oppure se sta aspettando che il ribasso incominci per muoversi.

(1) «But we believe that such an extrapolation is too simplistic. It ignores far too many differences between the recent recession and the deep downturns of the past, e.g. those of 1973-1975 and 1981-1982. The following differences seem particularly important: 1. Bank credit is tighter. Although the deep recessions of the past often did feature significant financial distress, this was usually directly related to high short-term interest rates. Once the Fed cut rates and the yield curve started to steepen, banks’ willingness to lend rebounded sharply. This is visible in the Fed’s Senior Loan Officers’ survey, which showed that the net percentage of banks increasing their willingness to lend to consumer stood at +28% in 1975Q2 and +53% in 1983Q1, the quarters immediately following the end of the recession. In contrast, the same indicator stands at -1.9% now. 2. The personal saving rate is much lower. At the end of the 1973-75 and 1981-1982 recessions, the personal saving rate stood at 10% or more. Now, it stands at 3.3%. Thus, consumers have less wherewithal to support sharp pickup in consumer spending growth of the kind that often occurred following prior deep recessions. 3. The labor market is less cyclical. This may sound like an odd statement at a time when the Great Recession has just pushed the unemployment rate from below 5% to over 10%. But what we mean is simply that the labor market looks less primed for a sharp rebound than it did in 1975 or 1982, largely because of the changes in industrial structure and corporate behavior documented in our Brave New Business Cycle research of the 1990s. One quantitative measure of this is the share of workers on “temporary layoff,” which currently stands at 1.1% of the labor force compared with more than 2% in both 1975 and 1982. 4. There is much more excess housing supply. Although the 1973-75 and 1981-82 recessions also featured severe declines in housing starts and residential construction, the reason for these declines was mainly a tight monetary policy. This time, it is mainly the massive excess supply of housing, as illustrated by the 2.6% homeowner vacancy rate compared with respective rates of 1.3% and 1.6% at the end of the 1973-75 and 1981-82 recessions. Rental vacancy rates are also much higher now. Reversing a tight monetary policy is a much faster process than unwinding a large-scale housing supply overhang. 5. State and local budgets are in worse shape. State and local governments are seeing the biggest drop in tax receipts in postwar history. As of the second quarter of 2009, real receipts were down 7.9% on a year earlier, compared with peak declines of 4.9% in 1973-1975 and just 0.2% in 1981-1982. The decline is unlikely to end next year, so states and municipalities will probably need to continue tightening their belts.  Again, we do expect final demand to recover gradually in 2010 as noted above. But “gradually” is the watchword, and a V-shaped recovery remains unlikely».